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1. Introduction. The rise and fall of European mercantilism 
 At the start of the first millennium, Western Europe was the most peripheral region 
within Eurasia. Like Africa, its exports largely consisted of forest products and slaves, and it had 
direct economic links with just two other Eurasian regions, Eastern Europe and the Islamic world.  
By contrast, the Muslim world had direct economic contacts with all the regions of the then 
known world: Eastern and Western Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, the steppe societies of central 
Asia, and the highly developed civilisations of South Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asia (Findlay 
and O'Rourke 2007).  
 By the 18th century, Western Europe was no longer a peripheral appendage of the 
Eurasian landmass, but had become geographically and politically central.  It was now in direct 
contact with all other regions of Eurasia, as well as with sub-Saharan Africa, but more 
importantly controlled both North and South America, which were fully integrated into the world 
economy, importing slaves from Africa, exporting a variety of colonial goods to Europe, and 
exporting silver both to Europe and to Asia via the Philippines. As for Eastern Europe, it was now 
in direct contact not just with central Asia and the Muslim world, but with East Asia and North 
America as well, as a result of Russia's Siberian conquests which would prove to be the most 
enduring of all the European imperialisms of that time. 
 In contrast to China, which was relatively self-sufficient, European merchants and states 
had a strong interest in seeking out direct routes to sub-Saharan gold deposits, thus bypassing the 
Muslim middlemen to the who controlled the trans-Saharan trade; purchasing African slaves, and 
using these on the sugar plantations of newly-discovered offshore African islands; and ultimately 
in circumnavigating Africa, reaching Asian spice markets directly, and again cutting out Muslim 
(and Venetian) middlemen.  Once Columbus stumbled upon the Americas, Europeans had every 
incentive to exploit the vast resources of this New World as fully as possible.  All of these 
activities were extremely lucrative, and the mutual dependence of Power and Plenty (Viner 1948) 
meant that states as well as merchants had a powerful motive to pursue them.  Trade profited 
merchants, but also yielded revenues to the state; while the state needed revenues to secure 
trading opportunities for its merchants, by force if necessary.  Trade and empire were thus 
inextricably linked in the minds of European statesman during the early modern period, which 
explains the incessant mercantilist warfare of the time.  
 The 18th century saw the gradual rise to pre-eminence of Britain in this struggle for 
power and plenty in the west, while Russia became dominant in the east.  The Iberians continued 
their hold on Latin America, but the 17th century saw Portugal being replaced in the Indian 
Ocean and Southeast Asia by the Dutch. 1648 was an important turning point, marking the end of 
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the long-standing war between the Netherlands and Spain.  This freed up silver and soldiers, two 
essential "inputs" for the Dutch East India Company's activities in Asia, and facilitated a series of 
conquests in Ceylon, on the Malabar coast, and in the East Indies.  By the late 17th century, the 
Dutch had succeeded in controlling the supply of spices such as cloves, leading to a dramatic 
reduction in their exports, and an end to Southeast Asia's "Age of Commerce".  As Figure 4.1 
shows, the Dutch maintained their dominant position in the European-Asian seaborne trade until 
the end of the 18th century. Meanwhile, the British found in India an abundant supply of several 
commodities, notably cotton textiles, which they exported not only to Europe, but to Africa and 
the Americas as well. By the third quarter of the 18th century, and after military victories at 
Plassey in 1757, and Buxar in 1764, the English East India Company was embarked on a path 
which would ultimately lead to dominion over the entire subcontinent. After the Bengal mutiny of 
1857, India formerly became part of the British Empire.  
In Western Europe, the triangular struggle for domination between the Netherlands, 
France and England became a bilateral struggle between the latter two powers following William 
of Orange's takeover of the British throne in 1688-1689.  England and France fought during the 
Nine Years War (1689-1697), the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713), and the War of the 
Austrian Succession (1740-1748).  The Seven Years War (1756-1763) was an important victory 
for Britain, which gained control of France's North American possessions as well as several 
islands and ports in the Caribbean and along the African and Indian coasts.  In Eastern Europe, 
Russia under Peter the Great and Catherine the Great was strengthening her position as a great 
European power, defeating Sweden in the Great Northern War, absorbing the former Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania and much of Poland, and expanding to the south at the expense of the Tartar 
Khanates and the Ottoman Empire. Russia had already expanded eastwards as far as the Pacific 
by the middle of the 17th century; it now had secure footholds on both the Baltic and Black seas. 
 All these European powers pursued a variety of mercantilists policies, designed to enrich 
both the state and the local merchant class. These included protecting local industries against 
foreign competition, protecting the local shipping industry by preventing foreign merchants from 
trading with either the mother country or its colonies, and a variety of policies designed to extract 
as much profit as possible from those colonies. Empires yielded financial benefits by providing 
control over precious metal supplies (in Latin America); giving access to abundant supplies of 
slaves (Africa); allowing the cultivation of warm-climate crops such as tobacco and cotton, or 
trapping furs in colder climates, and selling these on to consumers in Europe (the Americas and 
North Asia); or allowing control over trade routes, or better yet the sources of supply of scarce 
commodities such as spices (in Asia). 
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 Such considerations were also present at the time of the Ottoman expansion into Central 
and Eastern Europe, although the desire to spread Islam was another motivation, just as spreading 
Christianity was a concern of the early Iberian explorers.  Booty, control over trade routes, and (in 
the 14th and 15th centuries) access to the silver mines of Serbia and Macedonia were all 
important motives for the Turks, and indeed the prospect of plunder can help to explain why 
many Christians fought on the Ottoman side.  Furthermore, the Ottomans actively intervened to 
prevent the Portuguese from obtaining a monopoly of the spice trade in the Indian Ocean, fighting 
the interlopers both directly along the Persian Gulf, and indirectly via their support for the sultan 
of Acheh, from where pepper continued to be exported to Ottoman-held territory, and from there 
to Venice. This allowed the Ottomans to continue enjoying the rents from the transit trade until 
the appearance of the Dutch and English in the Indian Ocean in the 17th century. The Ottomans 
were not mercantilists, in that they were not concerned with the interests of domestic merchants 
or producers, and correctly understood that imports were desirable, and that the fewer exports 
were needed to pay for these imports the better.  However, they were also sensitive to the mutual 
dependence of Power and Plenty, which was a general feature of the Eurasian geopolitical 
landscape at a time when the Military Revolution was making warfare more expensive, and 
reducing the number of states that were militarily viable at any given time. 
 This mercantilist system was swept away in the early 19th century as a result of 
technological and geopolitical change.  Paradoxically, the beginning of the end occurred in North 
America, partly at least as a result of British successes there.  As a number of observers predicted 
following the end of the Seven Years War, without a French presence threatening the British 
colonists there, those colonists would now find it easier to press for independence from the 
mother country. The fiscal crisis which the conflict gave rise to provided one trigger for the 
American Revolution, which ended with the Peace of Paris in 1783. French involvement was 
crucial for the rebellion's success, but this in turn led to a fiscal crisis in France which again was 
one of the triggers leading to revolution there.  When war between Britain and France broke out 
yet again in 1793, it now had an additional ideological dimension adding to the severity and 
duration of the conflict, which only finally ended with the French defeat at Waterloo in 1815.  By 
that time, Napoleon's invasion of Iberia in 1807 had been followed by a series of revolutions in 
Latin America, and by the 1820s independent republics (or an empire in the case of Brazil), had 
been established across the continent.  Apart from Spanish Cuba and Puerto Rico, and British 
Canada, virtually nothing remained of Europe's New World empires. While these newly 
independent nations adopted highly protectionist policies during the 19th century, those tariffs 
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would be imposed in the context of a broadly multilateral international trading system, in which 
there were no more bilateral mercantilist restrictions on trade. 
 Several other factors promoted globalisation between 1815 and 1870. The post-war 
settlement, ushered in by the Congress of Vienna, led to a remarkably durable peace in Europe. 
Despite the Crimean War, the Franco-Prussian war, and a number of smaller conflicts, and 
despite the fact that the period ended with the disaster of the Great War, the century after 
Waterloo was a peaceful one by European standards.  The new transport technologies of the 
Industrial Revolution, described in Chapter 1.8, dramatically reduced transport costs.  
Geopolitically, new industrial military technologies increased the relative power of Europe and 
her most important overseas offshoot, the United States. The half-century following Waterloo 
saw major European imperial advances in India, North Africa and elsewhere, as well as the 
infamous Opium Wars which forcibly opened Chinese markets to trade.  Meanwhile, the United 
States expanded overland across North America, while Russia continued to expand in Asia.  
European states forced more or less free trade on their Imperial possessions or on nominally 
independent nations such as China, Japan and Siam. 
 The period also saw a gradual move towards trade liberalisation in Europe.  Early 
liberalisers were typically smaller countries, such as the Netherlands and Denmark.  The latter 
country had abolished import prohibitions and adopted low tariffs as early as 1797, while the 
Dutch moved to a relatively liberal trade policy in 1819, having seen the Dutch East India 
Company being destroyed during the war. The first major economy to liberalise was Britain, 
where power was shifting to export-oriented urban interests.  Liberal reforms in the 1820s and 
1830s were followed by Robert Peel's historic decision to abolish the Corn Laws in 1846, and 
move the United Kingdom to a unilateral policy of agricultural and industrial free trade, against 
the objections of landlords and much of his own Tory party.  There followed further moves 
towards liberalisation in countries such as Austria-Hungary, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Sweden, Norway and Denmark (Bairoch 1989, pp. 20-36).  For example, in 1849 Spain abolished 
its navigation laws and suppressed prohibitive tariffs, and the Spanish went on to liberalise 
imports of inputs into railway construction in the mid-1850s. Average tariffs were falling 
throughout the 1850s in the major European powers (Accominotti and Flandreau 2006). 
 Trade liberalisation was not universal. Russia and Austria-Hungary remained extremely 
protectionist throughout almost all the period, only liberalising slightly in the late 1860s.  The 
Ottoman Empire actually became more protectionist during the period, not less, although this is 
explained by the fact that it had previously been limited to a maximum 3% tariff as a result of 
various treaties signed with Western European powers.  In 1838, the Turks obtained the right to 
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raise their tariffs to 5%, but at the cost of abolishing all monopolies and prohibitions.  Overall, 
however, the period between Waterloo and 1870 was one in which both trade policy and 
technology were integrating international commodity markets.  The switch from mercantilism to 
modernity was now complete. 
  
2.  Quantitative trends, 1700-1870 
2.1.  Trade volumes 
 Using the shipping data in Figure 4.1, Jan de Vries (2003) estimates that the tonnage 
returned from Asia to Europe grew at 1.01% per annum during the 16th century, 1.24% during 
the 17th, 1.16% during the 18th, and at 1.1% over the three centuries as a whole.  O'Rourke and 
Williamson (2002a), using a more eclectic mix of data, calculate average growth rates per annum 
of European trade with both Asia and the Americas of 1.26% during the 16th century, 0.66% 
during the 17th, 1.26% during the 18th, and 1.06% per annum overall.  An average growth rate of 
roughly 1% per annum over a period of three centuries was an impressive achievement relative to 
what had gone before, and led to Europe, or at least the maritime powers of Western Europe, 
becoming more open, albeit from very low levels.  According to Maddison (2003), Western 
European GDP grew at roughly 0.4% per annum between 1500 and 1820, implying rising ratios 
of intercontinental trade to GDP.1 As a result, trade with Asia, Africa and America was a very 
important share of European trade in 1790 (Table 4.1). 
The wars of 1792-1815 and the Industrial Revolution were a turning point for European 
trade, dramatically increasing the relative importance of the United Kingdom (contrast Table 4.1 
and Table.2 with Table 4.54.3), and reducing European trade to GDP ratios. Both phenomena are 
partly explained by the fact that pre-1800 trade to GDP ratios were inflated by entrepôt trade 
(Table 4.4.4) which declined following the end of the “first” French and Iberian colonial empires 
and the collapse of the Dutch East India Company. Trade started growing again during the 1830s. 
Between 1820 and 1870, the volume of trade grew ninefold (Table 4.5) and the European trade to 
GDP ratio more than doubled. 
 
2.2. Commodity market integration  
Perhaps surprisingly, the increase in early modern trade volumes between Europe and the 
rest of the world was not accompanied by commodity price convergence, at least according to the 
data that have been analysed up to now (O'Rourke and Williamson 2002b). Figure 4.2 shows that 
                                                 
1  The Maddison figures probably represent an upper bound, given the lower growth figures (around 0.1% 
per annum) calculated by van Zanden (2005) and Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura (2007). 
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the ratio of the Amsterdam to the Asian prices for pepper and cloves did not fall before the 19th 
century, and there was substantial price divergence for cloves in the 1650s, coinciding with the 
establishment of Dutch control over clove supplies around that time.  Mercantilist policies could 
have directly prevented price convergence during this period, as the figures for cloves suggest, 
but mercantilism also created an international political environment in which wars were frequent, 
and this was  perhaps the key factor preventing long run price convergence.  Peaks in the clove 
price gaps during the first and second Anglo-Dutch wars, the Seven Years War, and the wars of 
1792-1815, lend credence to this view. More systematic price evidence is available for the latter 
conflict, and shows clearly that warfare led to a dramatic, worldwide disintegration of commodity 
markets (O'Rourke 2006). For example, the price of wheat rose by over 40% during 1807-14 
relative to textiles in Britain, which imported wheat and exported textiles, but it fell in France, 
which was a wheat exporter and cotton textile importer.  Similarly the price of raw cotton rose 
relative to textiles in Europe, but fell substantially in the United States. 
 Figure 4.2 shows dramatic price convergence between Southeast Asia and the 
Netherlands once the wars had ended, and a vast array of evidence documents international price 
convergence more generally during the 19th century.  Figure 4.3 shows that while the Anglo-
American wheat price gap fluctuated widely before 1840 or so, around a roughly constant trend, it 
started to drop dramatically after that date, coinciding with the commencement of large-scale 
shipments of wheat between United States and Britain.  Jacks (2005, p. 399) concludes that there 
is evidence of a "truly international market for wheat from around 1835".  This evidence (cf. 
Federico and Persson 2007) is important, since it shows that international price convergence 
characterised the 19th century as a whole, not just the years after 1870. 
 Another important change after 1800 concerns the types of commodities which could be 
transported profitably between continents.  As Table 4.6 shows, European imports from the rest 
of the world before then were mostly high value-to-weight ratio commodities, which could bear 
the cost of transport because they were not produced in Europe at all, or only with some 
difficulty.  There was a gradual evolution, to be sure.  During the 16th century, silver and spices 
were the dominant imports from the Americas and Asia respectively.  Around the middle of the 
17th century Indian textiles became the leading European import from Asia, but the European 
textile industry was still uncompetitive relative to Indian weavers.  Around the same time, 
"colonial goods" such as sugar and tobacco were becoming important New World exports, but 
these were warm-climate commodities that could not be easily grown in Western Europe.  There 
was thus an evolution in the nature of intercontinental trade during the early modern period, 
towards bulkier commodities, but the period before 1800 did not, for the most part, involve large 
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scale intercontinental trade in basic, heavy commodities such as wheat which could be easily 
grown both inside and outside Europe. 
 The new transport technologies of the 19th century meant that such basic, "competing" 
commodities could indeed be shipped across the oceans of the world.  European prices for 
temperate climate agricultural commodities now started to reflect American, Australian and 
Russian factor endowments rather than demand and supply in Western Europe alone, implying 
that, in line with Heckscher-Ohlin logic, cheap overseas food started to place European land rents 
under pressure (O'Rourke and Williamson 2005).  This would only become important in the years 
after 1870, when these Heckscher-Ohlin forces would have important political repercussions. 
However, the seeds of that retreat from globalization were sown in the half century following 
Waterloo. 
 
3.  Trade, empire and growth 
3.1.  Introduction 
 Aggregate evidence suggests that trade was positively associated with growth in Europe 
during the 17th and 18th centuries.  Both the urbanisation rate and GDP grew more rapidly in the 
"Atlantic" European economies (England, France, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) than in 
the rest of Western Europe or Asia between 1500 and 1800 (Acemoglu et al 2005, Maddison 
2003).  Allen (2003) also finds a strong positive relationship between trade and growth in Europe 
during this period, concluding that "the intercontinental trade boom was a key development that 
propelled north-western Europe forwards" (p.  432). 
It is less clear what the mechanisms were linking trade with economic growth.  Different 
authors, discussing the impact of trade on various European countries, tend to assume different 
mechanisms, while to make matters even more complicated the literature very often (if 
understandably, given the realities of mercantilism) conflates two conceptually distinct issues, 
namely the impact of trade in general, and the effects of countries’ colonial policies.  In what 
follows, we therefore look at the mechanisms through which, it has been suggested, trade might 
have influenced growth.  We then consider the link between imperialism per se and economic 
welfare, using the Iberian loss of its Latin American colonies as a "natural experiment".  Finally, 
we take a more detailed look at the various links between trade and the central economic event of 
this period, the British Industrial Revolution. 
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3.2. Mechanisms 
 How might trade have affected growth during this period? One crucial issue is whether or 
not all resources in the economy were fully employed.  With full employment, allocating 
resources to exports had an opportunity cost, as they could alternatively have been used in 
production for the domestic market.  While a "comparative advantage" perspective leads to the 
conclusion that trade was beneficial for economies, it also tends to imply that the gains involved 
were small (since the Harberger triangles measuring the gains of moving to free trade from some 
protectionist equilibrium are small relative to the size of the overall economy).  Thus Thomas and 
McCloskey (1981) among others conclude that if the British economy had been shut off from 
trade at the time of the Industrial Revolution, it would have produced a lot less cotton, but a lot 
more of other commodities, and sustained only a small welfare loss. 
 An alternative Smithian "vent for surplus" perspective assumes that resources in many 
18th century economies were unemployed, or at least underemployed, and that trade could bring 
these resources into productive (or more productive) employment at little or no opportunity cost.  
In this case, trade would have a bigger effect on economic growth, as O'Brien and Engerman 
(1991) argue for the British case. Faced with these two alternatives, some researchers have 
adopted the eclectic solution of providing upper (unemployment) and lower (full employment) 
bounds for the impact of trade or empire on particular economies. Nevertheless, both approaches 
tend to produce small numbers, with the estimated contribution of empire or trade to growth 
remaining modest compared with the expansion of the domestic market.  This is not surprising, 
since both approaches are essentially static, whereas economic growth is a dynamic process, 
involving both capital accumulation and technological change. 
 While any rigorous assessment of the impact of trade on economic growth requires 
specifying a theoretical model, be it static or dynamic, many traditional economic historians have 
preferred to give qualitative accounts emphasising the impact of trade on particular regions or 
sectors. In the case of 18th century France, for example, Butel and Crouzet (1998) have depicted 
imperial expansion in (and thus trade with) America and Asia as a non-negligible contribution to 
growth, that was however concentrated both by region -- in the Atlantic ports (Bordeaux, Nantes, 
Le Havre) and their immediate hinterlands -- and by sector.  Colonies represented a significant 
market for French industry, since they accounted for 45% of the total increase in manufactured 
exports during the 18th century.  While such figures should be tempered by the fact that on the 
eve of the French Revolution exports only represented 7% of industrial output, and colonial 
exports even less (only 2.5%), the impact of these exports was concentrated in a few sectors 
(linen especially), implying proportionately greater effects there.  Similarly, around 15% of 
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Portuguese linen output was exported to Brazil in the early 19th century (Pedreira 1993).  Butel 
and Crouzet also stress the feedbacks from colonial trade to non-exporting industries, including 
sugar refining, shipbuilding and its ancillary activities, as well as to the shipping industry, since 
transportation was on French ships. 
 In the case of Spain, trade with America increased between 1714 and 1796, especially 
during the late 18th century, promoting monetisation and market orientation at a time of growing 
population pressure and rising land rents. Trade stimulated industry and services, in particular 
shipbuilding and its associated activities (iron, timber and cordage industries).  Exports to the 
colonies benefited some industries and regions, but the small share of industrial goods and 
commercial services supplied to Latin America by Iberian firms and merchants before the break 
up of their empires stands in contrast to the linkages forged between the British economy and her 
overseas territories and markets. Monetisation, the commercialisation of agriculture and the 
stimulus of particular industries, such as the iron industry, are also seen as major benefits of 
foreign trade in Russia during this period (Kahan 1985). 
 Recent research has downplayed Spanish gains from colonial trade (Prados de la 
Escosura 1993).  The composition of trade suggests that the possibility of increasing production 
by reallocating resources was small, and that most gains possibly resulted from changing 
consumption patterns.  By 1792, over 60% of retained imports consisted of cocoa and sugar.  
Furthermore, these colonial products could have been acquired on international markets.  
Consequently, gains from colonial trade would only occur if, given colonial rule, Spain acquired 
the same commodities at lower prices.  Furthermore, Spain's dependence on the colonies for raw 
materials was very small (raw cotton and dyestuffs only represented 4% of retained imports in 
1792).  This is of course a measure of the weakness of domestic manufacturing.  In the Catalan 
cotton textile industry (one of the most dynamic industries at the end of the 18th century), 
European cotton yarn imports were more important than colonial raw cotton imports, suggesting 
how weak the Catalan spinning industry was at the time. 
 Industrial exports, concentrated in a few sectors (textiles: 36.6% in 1792; iron and steel: 
3.2%; paper: 4.4%; and food: 22.3%) stimulated industrial expansion and were associated with 
some external economies in their regions of origin.  Colonial protectionist legislation made 
Spanish manufactures artificially competitive on the Spanish American market.  An upper bound 
computation suggests that exports of domestic manufactures to the colonies made a 5% 
contribution to industrial value added before the Napoleonic Wars (ibid). 
 One way of gauging the importance of overseas trade to the economies of Western 
Europe is to see what happened when the trade between Continental Europe and the Americas 
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was suppressed by British blockades after 1807. Crouzet (1964, p. 571) presents a vivid picture of 
a deindustrializing Western European seaboard during this period: "Harbors were deserted, grass 
was growing in the streets, and in large towns like Amsterdam, Bordeaux, and Marseilles, 
population did actually decrease..." Industries which particularly suffered included shipbuilding, 
and those processing colonial raw materials such as sugar and tobacco.  A variety of food-
processing industries were also badly affected, as well as cotton printing, but the most important 
victim was the linen industry in regions like Western France, Flanders, Holland and Germany.  
According to Crouzet (p. 573), the damage done to the outward-oriented Atlantic economy of 
Continental Western Europe was permanent. On the other hand, trade disruption also led to the 
development of import substituting industries protected from British competition by wartime 
blockades, notably the cotton textile industry.  To repeat, in a world with scarce resources which 
can be transferred from one activity to another, there is a limit to how great can be the static 
welfare losses associated with trade disruption, unless one assumes asymmetries across sectors 
(for example, associated with externalities: Engerman 1998). 
 Daudin (2006) abandons this essentially static perspective in favour of a more dynamic 
one, focused on profits and capital accumulation.  The question he addresses is the extent to 
which colonial profits contributed to capital formation in France before the Revolution.  Net re-
invested profits linked to the overseas sector represented up to 6% of French savings, and were 
responsible for approximately 7% of French GDP per capita growth between 1715 and 1790. This 
implies that by 1790 GDP would have been only 3% smaller in their absence.  However, a further 
conjectural exercise (Daudin 2004), assuming that high overseas profits encouraged investment 
throughout the economy, suggests that they might have been responsible for as much as one-third 
of French growth. 
 A very different mechanism linking trade and growth was proposed by Voltaire more 
than two centuries ago. He argued that Britain's success in trade and the freedom of her 
constitution mutually reinforced each other in a virtuous circle: "trade, which has made richer the 
citizens of England, has helped to make them free, and this freedom has, in turn, enlarged trade" 
(cited in Findlay and O'Rourke 2007, p. 347). Similarly, Acemoglu et al. (2005) claim that 
Atlantic trade strengthened the political power of merchants, who obtained a strengthening of 
property rights in consequence.  According to these authors, these beneficial political 
consequences of trade did not occur in states which had initially been more absolutist than, say, 
Britain, and there is a case to be made that imperialism strengthened rather than weakened 
absolutist monarchs in Iberia at this time. In early modern Europe state power was constrained by 
the Crown's needs to raise taxes.  The more kings depended on taxes, the less sovereign and 
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autonomous they became.  Colonial revenues allowed the rise of a strong political centre which 
concentrated power without being drawn into extensive bargaining with its more prominent 
subjects and institutions.  In Portugal, the tax on gold accounted for some 10% of public revenue 
in 1716, while by the 1760s, just before the gold and diamond mines started to decline, it 
provided a fifth of state receipts.  Brazil supplied around 40% of government tax returns at the 
time of the Marquis of Pombal. In Spain, prior to the Napoleonic wars, Crown revenues of 
colonial origin (including the surplus from colonial chests and those derived from customs duties) 
represented one-fourth of the total.  In Spain, as in Portugal, bullion not only underpinned regal 
power but augmented the incomes of the aristocracy, and thereby reduced their need to increase 
taxation and rents from the population.  Thus, the colonial empire helped to consolidate and 
stabilise traditional institutions and structures of power, status and property rights within Iberia, 
implying comparatively few representative institutions there. 
 The emancipation of the American colonies at the start of the 19th century marked the 
end of the Iberian Ancien Regime, and opened the way to liberal revolutions in Spain and Portugal 
with implications for the economic development and international position of Iberia that have 
remained largely unexplored.  Accounts of economic backwardness in 19th century Iberia have 
often placed the blame on the loss of empire, but this may in fact have contributed significantly to 
the economic and social modernisation of the peninsula. 
  
3.3. Empires and welfare 
 The question of why European countries chose to build empires has long been 
controversial. Several hypotheses have been proposed, ranging from the purely economic to the 
purely political, with several intermediate cases as well.  Among the more economic explanations 
is the Vinerian view which we have already encountered that in the absence of integrated 
international markets, caused largely by insecurity in an age of widespread piracy and warfare, 
overseas expansion permitted the creation of reserved markets, thus intertwining conquest and 
trade.  If Spanish merchants, say, were to be able to trade in a given area, the Spanish government 
would have to make this possible by excluding other merchants and governments from that area, 
since otherwise the Spanish would themselves be excluded.  This is not to deny that a generally 
free trading situation would have been preferable to one in which each country pursued a 
mercantilist strategy, which might have been individually rational, from a military or even 
economic viewpoint, but which produced a collectively suboptimal outcome.  From a historical 
point of view however one can ask: is this a realistic counterfactual, in a world without a 
collective security regime?  Findlay and O'Rourke (2007, p.257) argue that for the individual 
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European state, pondering what such a unilateral conversion to peaceful free trade might bring, 
"in the absence of... a clearly defined hegemonic power, military defeat and exclusion from 
foreign markets” seems a plausible answer. 
 Other less economic explanations for empire have also been proposed.  For example, in 
response to the question as to why, once the technological constraints that impeded long-distance 
oceanic voyages had been removed, only some European countries established colonies overseas, 
Elliott (1990) proposed an explanation based on previous histories of expansion.  Iberian plunder, 
settlement, and colonisation in the Americas, in this view, represented a follow-up to the 
reconquest ("reconquista") of territories previously under Muslim control, while England's 
overseas expansion in the 17th century followed the conquest of Ireland in the previous century.  
Why did other countries in Europe eventually join them?  Here Elliott points to competition 
between European nation-states, which triggered an emulation process leading to the seizure and 
occupation of New World lands.  In this scenario, the fact that all of Europe ultimately became 
involved in overseas expansion was at least in part unintended. 
 Another view points to the interconnections between empire and nation-state building, 
with countries in Europe struggling not to be left behind.  This interpretation regards as 
economistic and anachronistic the view that states and merchants needed reserved markets and 
supply sources in an uncertain world, and regards colonies not as an investment, but rather as 
costs paid for non-economic ends (Engerman 1998). The costs of empire are undeniable, since 
colonies needed to be acquired, settled, and defended.  Wars, losses of life and ships represented -
- from a purely economic perspective -- a diversion of resources from alternative uses.  War costs 
had to be financed through taxes, inflation or public debt. Besides, the colonial system involved 
navigation laws that imposed an implicit tax on consumers, as they usually had to pay a price 
above that of the most efficient producer. 
 A recurring theme in the Iberian literature is whether Portugal and Spain did not develop 
because, in building their empires, the metropolitan economy was disregarded.  Did empires 
represent a significant opportunity cost, absorbing resources that could have been allocated to 
productive investment (Fontana 1991), or were such costs a prerequisite for economic 
development?  In order to realise the potential inherent in the discovery of the resource-abundant 
but labour-scarce Americas, the Iberian powers required continuous investment in social 
overhead capital (ports, roads, housing, internal transportation, and oceanic shipping) and the 
establishment of new political and commercial organisations.  This task was mainly undertaken 
by Iberians, while benefiting the rest of Europe, for at least 150 years after Columbus (O'Brien 
and Prados de la Escosura 1998).  In the case of Portugal, it might be argued that emigration 
Guillaume Daudin, Kevin H. O’Rourke, Leandros Prados de la Escosura 
 13
deprived the country of manpower, skills and entrepreneurship, since emigrants were young 
males, and more literate and ambitious than average.  On the other hand, emigration made 
possible the colonisation of new territories, opening new markets and providing luxuries and 
tropical groceries at lower cost.  Furthermore, emigration eased economic conditions in the more 
densely populated areas, especially in the northwest. 
 Ironically, in the light of this literature, it may be the flow of resources from the Americas 
to Iberia that did the most damage to the Spanish and Portuguese economies in the long run.  
First, as we have already seen, bullion flows strengthened absolutist monarchies and central 
governments, with damaging political and economic consequences.  Second, the inflow of specie, 
gold in Portugal and silver in Spain, may have provoked a "Dutch disease" of sorts, damaging the 
competitiveness of local manufacturing industries (Forsyth and Nicholas 1983; Drelichman 
2005). 
 One way of assessing the importance of empire to the Iberian economies is to explore 
what happened after the loss of those empires.  By 1827, once Brazil had severed her links to 
Portugal and declared full independence, real Portuguese domestic exports represented just two 
thirds of their average level in 1796/1806.  However, this conceals a switch from industrial to 
agricultural exports, with Portugal reorienting its economy towards Britain by selling its primary 
produce in exchange for manufactures, within the context of an improving terms of trade.  
Services suffered more, contracting by one fifth in real terms between the same dates. For 
example, Portugal could no longer be an entrepôt for the produce of Brazil. Pedreira (1993) 
suggests that the loss of Brazil implied an upper bound loss of 8% of GDP. A widespread 
consensus views Portugal as being now confined to the role of supplier of foodstuffs and raw 
materials, with no opportunities to specialise within the more dynamic industrial sector. However, 
since the old colonial system did not bring Portugal to the verge of modern industrialisation, its 
breakdown can hardly be blamed for the country's failure to subsequently industrialise.   
 In contrast to Great Britain and the thirteen North American colonies, where commercial 
links were immediately and vigorously renewed after their independence (Shepherd and Walton 
1976), Spain and the new Latin American republics practically cut ties (except for the trade using 
Cuba as an entrepôt).  From the beginning of the war with Britain in October 1796, Spain 
maintained almost no link with the colonies for more than two decades. The subsequent decline in 
domestic exports (roughly 25% between 1784/96 and 1815/20) can be attributed almost 
exclusively to the fall in colonial commerce (which shrank by 40%).  The consequence was the 
end of the long-standing equilibrium distribution of domestic exports between the colonies and 
Europe (roughly one-third and two-thirds, respectively), and the establishment of a new 
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distribution that continued throughout the 19th century (with foreign markets absorbing four-
fifths).  Retained imports of colonial goods for domestic consumption (which had represented 
one-third of total retained imports) were halved , but this was offset by imports from Europe. The 
collapse of trade with the empire was particularly significant for services (financial, insurance, 
transportation), as is revealed by the contraction of real re-exports by three-fifths between 
1784/96 and 1815/20.  The Spanish balance of trade also felt the effects of colonial independence. 
Before the loss of empire, Spain had a deficit on current account with foreign countries that was 
balanced by a corresponding surplus in colonial trade. With colonial emancipation this balancing 
mechanism disappeared, with deflationary consequences for the domestic economy. Fortunately, 
a favourable terms of trade – resulting from an improvement vis-à-vis Europe, more than 
matching a deterioration with respect to the colonies -- increased the purchasing power per unit of 
exports by 20% between 1784/96 and 1815/20, allowing Spain to avoid further deterioration in 
the current account balance.  
Prados de la Escosura (1993) has attempted a rough estimate of the real cost to Spain of 
the loss of her colonies, making assumptions favourable to the generally accepted view that the 
loss was significant. The first assumption is that the productive resources embodied in 
exportables did not have alternative uses in the domestic economy. A similar assumption is made 
regarding the services (shipping, insurance, mercantile) provided by Spanish subjects in the 
colonial trade. In contrast to the non-colonial trade, almost totally carried on non-Spanish ships, 
Spanish colonial legislation ensured that the Indies trade used only national shipping.  Therefore, 
with the decline of Spanish American trade, a decline in Spanish maritime services closely 
followed. The loss in revenues due to the cessation of precious metal shipments, and the reduction 
of customs duties resulting from colonial independence, were also taken into account, the 
assumption being that public revenues from the colonies were productively used in the domestic 
economy. The upper bound estimate of Spanish losses implied by these assumptions was not 
more than 8% of national income. And while it could be argued that the profits from colonial 
trade represented a high proportion of the funds used to finance investment in Spain, an upper 
bound estimate of their contribution made to total capital formation is below 18% by 1784/96.   
 The long term consequences of the loss of the colonies depended on the flexibility and 
dynamic nature of the industry concerned.  The decline in manufactured exports from many 
sectors illustrates the lack of competitiveness of Spanish industries: Spain could not offer the 
Latin American consumer either the prices or the quality of her Western European competitors, 
specifically Great Britain. For example, the Basque iron and steel industry (which sold at least a 
third of its output to colonial markets at the end of the 18th century) became uncompetitive from 
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the 1770s onward.  A similar situation characterised the Valencia silk industry.  Between the 
1790s and the 1820s net exports of raw silk rose while net imports of silk textiles increased.  
Catalan shipping was yet another industry which had grown under colonial protection and 
suffered afterwards.  However, Catalan cotton textiles developed further once the colonial market 
had been lost. The more competitive and flexible sectors of the economy eventually adapted to 
new circumstance, particularly commercial agriculture which turned towards growing markets in 
Western Europe. As mentioned earlier, the 19th century was a good time to do this, in that the 
terms of trade moved favourably for agricultural producers, with technological progress lowering 
the prices of industrial goods and growing demand raising relative agricultural prices (Figure 4.4).  
The loss of the colonies had a less profound and widespread impact upon the Spanish economy 
than the historical literature has suggested.  
 
3.4. Trade and the Industrial Revolution 
 Chapter 1 provided a broad overview of Europe’s transition to modern economic growth.  
We now focus on one particular aspect of this transition, and ask: what was the impact of trade 
and empire on the British Industrial Revolution? The literature on this issue has largely been 
shaped by the dominant economic theories of the day. One particularly influential strand of 
thought has been inspired by the assumption of Classical economists, from Smith to Marx, that 
growth depends on investment, which depends on savings, which depends on profits (since 
workers were assumed to be too poor to save, and landlords too frivolous).  In a famous book, 
Eric Williams (1966) argued that Atlantic slave trade profits financed the Industrial Revolution. 
His largely anecdotal evidence consisted of enumerating cases in which those associated with 
slavery made investments in domestic British industry. The classic quantitative responses to 
Williams were made by Engerman (1972) and O’Brien (1982), both of whom measured the 
profits associated with the slave trade (or, in the case of O’Brien, with Britain’s trans-oceanic 
activities more generally), and found these to have been too small to have possibly mattered. For 
example, O’Brien found that the total profits accruing to those engaged in trade and commerce 
with the ‘periphery’ in 1784-86 amounted to £5.66 million. If 30% of these profits were saved 
and reinvested, then that would have financed roughly 15% of British gross investment during 
that period. Since 15% was, for O’Brien, a small figure, the Williams thesis ‘foundered on the 
numbers’ (p. 16). 
 There is a more fundamental problem with the Williams thesis, which is that as we saw in 
Chapter 1, technological change rather than capital accumulation was the driving force behind the 
Industrial Revolution. By focussing on profits as the possible link between overseas trade, empire 
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and slavery on the one hand, and European growth on the other, Williams and others have been 
barking up the wrong channel. If Marxist economic theory is ill-suited to explain the Industrial 
Revolution, then so too is Keynesian theory, by definition, since Keynes was concerned with the 
short run determination of output and employment, not with long run economic growth. This has 
not prevented various historians from attempting to argue that overseas demand exogenously 
boosted British industrial output during the transition to modern growth. As almost 60% of 
British cotton textile exports went to non-European countries during 1784-6 (Davis 1979), such a 
claim is understandable. However, growth is ultimately a supply-side phenomenon, and indeed if 
growth had been due to rising overseas demand, then Britain’s terms of trade should have 
increased during the Industrial Revolution, whereas in fact they fell, reflecting the cost-reducing 
nature of the innovations concerned (McCloskey 1981, Mokyr 1977). Figure 4.5 makes the point 
in a simple manner. According to Crafts and Harley (1992), industrial output rose by roughly 
235% between 1780 and 1831, while GDP rose by roughly 135%. If the income-elasticity of 
demand was unity, and foreign incomes rose at the same rate as British ones, then the demand for 
British manufactures at constant prices rose by roughly 135%. This can be illustrated by the 
outward shift of demand from D to D’ (ignore D” and D”’ for now). If the industrial supply curve 
were vertical, it would have shifted out by 235%, intersecting D’ at the new equilibrium, denoted 
by point B. The available data on the British terms of trade suggest that at this point, relative 
manufactured goods prices were (very roughly speaking) 55% lower than in the initial 
equilibrium A. If the elasticity of supply were unity, on the other hand, the supply curve would 
have shifted out (at constant prices) by 290% (=135+100+55), far more than the 135% outward 
shift in demand.  
 Findlay (1990) provides a simple general equilibrium model of the late 18th century 
Atlantic economy which, although it is static, can still help in thinking about how trade really 
mattered during the Industrial Revolution. That revolution was initially heavily concentrated in 
cotton textiles, and British imports of raw cotton came exclusively from outside Europe, and 
particularly from the Americas. The American supply was highly elastic, as a result of the then 
seemingly limitless endowment of New World land, and the highly elastic supply of slave labour. 
The Industrial Revolution meant a large increase in the demand for raw cotton, and hence a rise in 
its price at home and abroad, implying a deterioration in Britain’s terms of trade.  High American 
supply elasticities minimised this terms of trade loss – in the absence of slaves and New World 
land, relative raw cotton prices would have increased by more than they actually did, potentially 
choking off growth in this crucial sector. The existence of overseas markets also implied a higher 
demand for cotton textiles, and a more elastic demand as well. As can be seen from Figure 4.5, a 
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given supply shift due to industrial innovation would have had a smaller output effect, and 
reduced cotton textiles prices by even more than was actually the case, with inelastic demand 
(compare the shift from D to D’ with the shift from D’’ to D’’’).  
 Not only did trade ensure that a given supply side impulse travelled further; it also 
probably ensured more innovation, which was both motivated by profits and expensive (Allen 
2006).  Large fixed research and development costs implied that innovators had to make profits 
just to break even, and larger markets helped innovators recoup those fixed costs. Furthermore, 
under certain circumstances larger markets imply more elastic demand curves for individual 
monopolistically competitive firms (Desmet and Parente 2006). Thus a given price-reducing 
innovation will imply larger sales and revenue increases in larger markets, meaning that as 
markets expand, innovation becomes more likely. While this mechanism has yet to be quantified, 
presumably a closed Britain (even a closed Britain miraculously enabled to grow cotton) would 
not have experienced as much innovation as was in fact observed. Unlike China or the Mughal 
Empire, it was too small to rely on its domestic markets. As it was, increases in exports were 
equivalent to 21% of the total increase in GDP between 1780 and 1801 Crafts (1985, p. 131), 
over 50% of additional industrial output during the same period (Cuenca Esteban 1997), and over 
60% of additional textiles output between 1815 and 1841 (Harley 1999, p. 187).  
 Furthermore, by the late 18th century manufacturing was spreading across Western 
Europe, and English manufacturers were finding themselves increasingly excluded from markets 
in Germany, France, Sweden and elsewhere (Davis 1962). Not surprisingly, therefore, between 
1780 and 1801 the Americas accounted for roughly 60% of additional British exports (O’Brien 
and Engerman 1991, p. 186). British innovators were largely dependent on overseas markets as 
their industries expanded. The implication, in a mercantilist world in which nations systematically 
excluded their enemies from protected markets, is that British military success over the French 
and other European rivals was one ingredient in explaining her subsequent rise to economic 
prominence: certainly not a sufficient condition, since domestic conditions had to be right in order 
to spur innovation in the first place, but possibly a necessary one. 
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Table 4.1. European trade c. 1790 (£ million) 
 Imports Exports Re-exports Re-exports Total 
Share 
ROW 
 From Europe 
From 
ROW 
Toward 
Europe 
Toward 
ROW 
Toward 
Europe 
Toward 
ROW   
Britain 
(1784/86) 
(Including trade 
with Ireland) 
11.3 11.5 6.3 7.3 2.8 0.8 40.0 49% 
France (1787) 12.8 11.7 9.7 5.3 6.0 0.4 45.9 38% 
Netherlands 
(using 1770 
trade 
composition) 
9.3 3.6 8.3 (incl. re-X)
0.7 
(incl. re-X)
3.8 (colonial goods) 
2.4 (European goods) 21.9 20% 
Spain (1788/92) 
(ROW: 
America) 
3.6 2.0 3.5 1.9 1.4 2.2 19.0 36% 
Portugal 
(1796/1800) 
(ROW: Brazil) 
4.1 2.9 1.4 1.3 3.9 1.4 15.3 35% 
 
Sources: See Table 4.3 , and Pedreira (1993), Cuenca-Esteban (1989); Marshall (1833) 
 
 
Table 4.2. European merchant fleet c. 1790 
 Tons Percentage 
UK 881,963 26.2% 
France 729,340 21.6% 
Netherlands 397,709 11.8% 
Denmark and Norway 386,020 11.4% 
Italy, Trieste and Ragusa 352,713 10.5% 
Hamburg, Bremen, Lubeck, Rostock, Dantzig and Prussia 181,308 5.4% 
Sweden 169,279 5.0% 
Spain 149,460 4.4% 
Portugal 84,843 2.5% 
Russia 39,394 1.2% 
Total 3,372,09 100% 
 
Source: Romano (1962) 
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Table 4.3. Exports plus imports as share of GDP 
 c. 1655 c. 1720 c. 1755 c. 1790 1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 
Austria      11.4% 14.2% 13.2% 18.7% 29.0%
Belgium       19.0% 26.7% 31.3% 35.6%
Denmark     7.5% 17.5% 27.5% 36.5% 29.7% 35.7%
Finland         20.7% 31.7%
France  5.5% 14% 20% 9.8% 8.2% 10.7% 13.0% 20.2% 23.6%
Germany        19.2% 23.2% 36.8%
Greece         42.7% 45.6%
Hungary          19.4%
Italy         16.1% 18.3%
Netherlands 85% 82% 84% 110% 33.0% 25.8% 53.4% 64.0% 96.4% 115.4%
Norway          33.9%
Portugal        42.4% 33.9% 33.7%
Spain    15.7%  6.0%  7.3% 11.2% 11.7%
Sweden      5.7% 6.8% 13.8% 20.0% 29.4%
UK  19% 20% 24% 21.4% 18.8% 25.2% 27.8% 41.8% 43.6%
Best guess at total
European trade to GDP
ratio 
    13.4% 11.4% 15.4% 18.0% 24.9% 29.9%
Idem, net of intra-
European trade      3.8%  6.3% 8.9% 9.2%
 
Notes: Ottoman Empire, Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania and Serbia are not included in total Europe. 
“UK” pre-1800 is just England and Wales. 
 
Sources: Post-1800: Bairoch (1976), and data underlying Prados de la Escosura (2000). Pre-1800: 
Deane and Cole (1962 (1969)), Davis (1969, 1979), Officer (2001), Crafts (1985), Maddison (2001), 
de Vries and van der Woude (1997), McCusker (1978), Arnould (1791), Daudin (2005), Marczewski 
(1961), Prados de la Escosura (1993). 
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Table 4.4. Entrepôt and special trade (£ million) 
 
Retained 
imports (1) = 
total imports 
– Re-exports 
Domestic 
exports 
(2) 
Re-
exports 
(3) 
Special 
trade 
(4) = 
(1)+(2) 
Special trade as a 
share of total trade 
= 
100*(4)/[(4)+(3)+(3)]
Britain (1784/86) 19.2 13.6 3.6 32.8 82% 
France (1787) 18.1 15.0 6.4 33.1 72% 
Netherlands (using 
1770 trade 
composition) 
6.7 9.0 6.2 15.7 43% 
Spain (1788/92) 
 6.4 5.4 3.6 11.8 62% 
Portugal (1796/1800) 
 2.0 2.7 5.3 4.7 31% 
Note: retained imports are computed assuming that the value of a good is recorded identically 
when it is imported and when it is re-exported. Special trade excludes both re-exports and non-
retained imports. 
 
Source:  see Tables 4.1, 4.3. 
 
 
 
Table 4.5. European real trade 1820-1870 
 
1820 
(million 1990 $) 
Growth 1820-1870 
Austria 47 +894% 
Belgium 92 +1,245% 
France 487 +621% 
Italy 339 +427% 
Spain 137 +550% 
Switzerland 147 +653% 
UK  1,125 +988% 
Weighted average  +793% 
US 251 +12,010% 
 
Source: Maddison (2001). 
Guillaume Daudin, Kevin H. O’Rourke, Leandros Prados de la Escosura 
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Table 4.6.  Composition of European overseas imports, 1513-1780 
Panel A. Imports from Asia to Lisbon, 1513-1610 (% by weight) 
 1513-19 1523-31 1547-8 1587-8 1600-3 1608-10 
Pepper 80.0  84.0  89.0  68.0  65  69.0  
Other spices 18.4  15.6  9.6  11.6  16.2  10.9  
Indigo 0.0  0.0  0.0  8.4  4.4  7.7  
Textiles 0.2  0.0  0.0  10.5  12.2  7.8  
Misc. 1.4  0.4  1.4  1.5  2.2  4.6  
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100 
Panel B. Imports of VOC into Europe, 1619-1780 (% by invoice value) 
 1619-21 1648-50 1668-70 1698-1700 1738-40 1778-80 
Pepper 56.5  50.4  30.5  11.2  8.1  9  
Other spices 17.6  17.9  12.1  11.7  6.1  3.1  
Textiles 16.1  14.2  36.5  54.7  41.1  49.5  
Tea and coffee    4.2  32.2  27.2  
Drugs, perfumes and dye-stuffs 9.8  8.5  5.8  8.3  2.8  1.8  
Sugar  6.4  4.2  0.2  3.7  0.6  
Saltpetre  2.1  5.1  3.9  2.6  4.4  
Metals 0.1  0.5  5.7  5.3  1.1  2.7  
Misc.  0.2  0.1  0.4  2.3  1.7  
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100  
Panel C. Imports of English East India Company into Europe, 1668-1760 (% of invoice value) 
 1668-70 1698-1700 1738-40 1758-60   
Pepper 25.25  7.02  3.37  4.37    
Textiles 56.61  73.98  69.58  53.51    
Raw silk 0.6  7.09  10.89  12.27    
Tea  0.03  1.13  10.22  25.23    
Coffee 0.44  1.93  2.65     
Indigo 4.25  2.82      
Saltpetre 7.67  1.51  1.85  2.97    
Misc. 5.15  4.52  1.44  1.65    
Total 100 100 100 100   
Panel D. Estimated annual sales of colonial imports, England and Netherlands, 1751-4 
 Total sales (1000 pesos) Percentage of sales 
   From Asia Of total 
Textiles 6750  41.7  21.1  
Pepper 1100  6.8  3.4  
Tea  2800  17.3  8.7  
Coffee 1000  6.2  3.1  
Spices 1850  11.4  5.8  
Misc. 2700  16.7  8.4  
Total from Asia 16200  100.0  50.5  
   From America Of total 
Sugar 8050  50.8  25.1  
Tobacco 3700  23.3  11.5  
Misc. 4100  25.9  12.8  
Total from America 15850  100.0  49.5  
     
Total overseas imports 32050    100.0  
 
Source: Findlay and O’Rourke (2007, pp. 308-9). 
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Figure 4.1.  Numbers of ships sailing to Asia, per decade 
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Source: de Vries (2003). 
Guillaume Daudin, Kevin H. O’Rourke, Leandros Prados de la Escosura 
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Figure 4.2. Spice markups, 1580-1890 
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Source: Bulbeck et al. (1998). 
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Figure 4.3. Anglo-American wheat trade, 1800-2000 
 
 
Source: O'Rourke and Williamson (2005), p. 10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
40
80
120
160
200
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
1800 1825 1850 1875 1900 1925 1950 1975 2000
Anglo-American wheat price gap
British imports of US wheat
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 p
ric
e 
ga
p,
 3
 y
ea
r m
ov
in
g 
av
er
ag
e
Im
ports, thousands of cw
t.
Guillaume Daudin, Kevin H. O’Rourke, Leandros Prados de la Escosura 
 29
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4.  Spanish terms of trade vis-à-vis Britain 1714-1882 (1854 =100) 
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Source: Prados de la Escosura (mimeo). 
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Figure 4.5. Demand versus supply during the Industrial Revolution 
 
Source: Findlay and O’Rourke (2007), p. 306. 
135 100
55
55
Quantity
D D’ S
S’
A
B
Q0 Q1
Price
D”
C
D’”
